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Madhav Aney, Maitreesh Ghatak, and Massimo Morelli ∗
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Abstract
How can market failure interact with choice of institutional reform
made by an electorate? We study this question in the framework of oc-
cupational choice where agents are endowed heterogeneously with wealth
and talent. In our model, market failure due to unobservability of talent
endogenously creates a class structure that affects vote on institutional
reform. We find that the preferences of these classes may be highly non
monotonic in wealth and are often aligned in ways that creates a tension
between institutional reforms that are growth maximising and those that
are politically feasible. This is in contrast to the world without market
failure where the electorate unanimously vote in favour of surplus max-
imising institutional reform. We find that inefficiencies of market failure
may be further amplified by political choices made by interest groups
created in the inefficient market.
JEL Classification: O12, O16, O17
1 Introduction
It is well known that market failures abound in the real world. A key insight
in the institutional approach to development economics is that capital market
failures prevent individuals and economies from reaching their full potential and
can lead to poverty traps (see Banerjee and Newman (1993) and Galor and Zeira
(1993)). In this literature institutional frictions are taken as exogenous.
It is also well known that even fully accountable governments can fail to
implement growth maximising policies when they lack sufficient instruments for
compensating losers. Furthermore, the political economy approach to develop-
ment has emphasized how concentration of political power in the hands of an
elite, may lead to distortion of the market by the elites for maximising their own
payoffs.1 The existing political economy literature argues that the distribution
∗We would like to thank James Peck, Tomas Sjo¨tro¨m and seminar participants at the
Midwest Mathematical Economics and Theory Conference and the EOPP Workshop.
1This is most obvious when elites lobby for barriers to entry (Djankov et al. (2002)). Ace-
moglu (2003) makes the argument that concentration of political power may lead to distortion
of the market through manipulation of factor prices in ways that benefit the political elites.
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of political power may be sufficiently spiked so as to allow the elites to distort
the market outcome in their favour, and this typically leads to inefficiencies.
In this paper we highlight the reverse link, namely that market failure may
create a political failure even when political power is uniformly distributed.
We think of political failure as the failure of the electorate to pick the surplus
maximising reform.2 The motivation for this paper is to uncover the politi-
cal implications of market failure. In our model, in the first best world with
well functioning markets, the electorate unanimously chooses institutions that
maximise total surplus. However once a market imperfection in the form of
unobservability of entrepreneurial talent is introduced, things change dramati-
cally. The market responds to this imperfection by screening agents based on
their wealth. This leads to creation of a class structure in the economy with
preferences that are aligned in ways that defeat surplus maximising reforms.
We argue that in addition to the well known impact of market failure ar-
ticulated in the literature on poverty traps, there may be a political impact of
market failure. The latter problem could turn out to be more persistent since
unlike the solutions to poverty traps that are easier to characterise3, the so-
lutions to political failure that are politically feasible may not exist. A more
general message emerging from our model is that market and political failures
complement each other in terms of generating economic inefficiencies.
1.1 Related literature
A paper that is related to ours is Acemoglu and Verdier (2000) where the choice
between market failure or corruption is studied. In that model market failure
creates a need for bureaucracy which would not arise in the first best world.
However there are agency problems within the government since bureaucrats
are hard to monitor. This creates a trade-off between the inefficiency of market
failure and tolerating corruption. Our paper on the other hand shows that even
a fully accountable government without any agency problems would be guided
by the electorate to choose sub-optimal reforms. The point of our model is that
market failure may shape the political economy in inefficient ways.
Our paper is related to the growing literature on micro political economy.
This literature looks at failure of alternative institutions and asks two questions:
1. Which institutions make an economy more productive?
2. Which institutions are more likely to be chosen given a certain distribution
of political power?
There are four papers that ask similar questions. Perotti and Volpin (2004)
have a model where agents are endowed with wealth and are either consumers
or entrepreneurs. There is a non convexity in the production function and
entrepreneurs with wealth lower than a certain threshold are financed by equity.
Project returns are subject to the ex post moral hazard problem and investor
protection, the institution that they study, can mitigate the problem. Elites that
2For a somewhat different notion of political failure see Besley (2006)
3Micro-lending has been a big theme in this literature. See for example Ghatak and
Guinnane (1999)
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have wealth over the threshold required to start an enterprise lobby for lower
investor protection so as to face a lower competition in the product market.
The political economy process is modelled as a social planner that maxmises
the weighted sum of the total surplus and bribes from lobbies. As the weight
on the bribes increases, investor protection goes down.
Rajan and Zingales (2006) study a model with 3 groups of exogenous size; the
educated, the uneducated, and the oligarchs. They consider educational and pro
market reform. Educational reforms allow the uneducated to become educated
and increase their wages through an increase in their productivity. Pro market
reforms allow educated workers to setup their own firms. An agent’s preference
for any reform is driven by which group the agent belongs to.
Biais and Mariotti (2003) develop a model to address the question of optimal
bankruptcy laws. They have a model of occupational choice where agents can
be entrepreneurs or workers. Credit market is imperfect because entrepreneurial
effort is unobservable. The mechanism through which bankruptcy law affects
total surplus is the following: a tough bankruptcy law implies a strong threat of
liquidation ex-ante. This induces high effort which increases surplus. However
liquidation is ex-post inefficient since some surplus is lost when a company is
harvested for its assets at liquidation. In terms of the political economy; rich
want soft laws to have lower wages. Poor want the opposite. The agents with
intermediate wealth align with rich if they are entrepreneurs and align with
poor otherwise. This paper is similar to ours in the sense that here too a
market failure generates the need for institutions. The paper differs from ours
in terms of the result they find on the choices an electorate make. In their
model soft laws which are often chosen by the electorate are often efficient due
to inefficiency of liquidation ex post. In contrast, our results indicates that their
exists an inherent tension between politically feasible and surplus maximising
reforms.
Another paper that is related to ours is Caselli and Gennaioli (2008). In
their model agents differ in two discrete dimensions; talent and license. There
is an exogenous mismatch between talent to run an enterprise and the endow-
ment of license that is requied to run an enterprise. They model how this
exogenously conferred incumbancy and talent interact to create preferences for
deregulation and legal reform. Deregulation lowers the cost of acquiring a new
license whereas legal reform makes the trade of licenses between agents easier.
In these models, markets can be complete and perfectly competitive if the best
possible institutions are chosen. In absence of such institutions, frictions are
created that take the economy away from the growth maximising outcome. In
Caselli and Gennaioli (2008) for instance, the lack of perfect legal institutions
creates a problem of enforceability of contracts between agents who wish to
trade licenses and the presence of regulation deters entry. Hence the source of
problems in these models is purely the exogenous presence of political allign-
ments that undermine the support for best possible institutions. In our model
on the other hand these political allignments are endogenised and the funda-
mental source of inefficiency will be the adverse selection problem created by
the unobservability of entrepreneurial talent. Institutions, depending on their
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quality, would mitigate or worsen this problem but even the best possible insti-
tutions will not be enough to solve the problem entirely since unobservability of
talent is an informational handicap. Caselli and Gennaioli (2008) focus on gov-
ernment frictions: in the absence of the exogenously given license requirements,
one would get the first best in their model. In our model, even with fully benev-
olent government and perfectly competitive markets, there are market frictions
arising from informational (i.e., adverse selection) and transactional constraints
(limited liability). As in the standard neoclassical model, preference and tech-
nology differences might have seemingly similar implications: e.g., in the Solow
model, low steady state output could result from lower saving propensity or use
of less efficient technology. However, the policy implications are dramatically
different: preference differences are more intractable than technology differences
and this is especially so if we recognize the potential mutual interaction of pref-
erences and technology adoption which, for example, reflects some underlying
market failure. Analogously, we argue that with government frictions the policy
implications are to be found in the political domain and are relatively easy to
characterize which is not to say they are easy to implement: improve political
institutions to improve the quality of candidates, improve incentives for incum-
bents so that inefficient rent-extracting policies are removed. In contrast, with
market frictions the policies are far less easy to characterize, and this is espe-
cially so if they interact with an otherwise frictionless political system where
the distribution of political power is uniform.
2 Model
The basic setup is similar to the model presented in extension section in Ghatak
et al. (2007).
2.1 Technology
There are two technologies in the economy: a subsistence technology that yields
w with certainty for one unit of labour and a more productive technology that
yields a return R in case of success and 0 in case of failure and requires n
workers and 1 entrepreneur to run it. In addition to the returns from the
project, entrepreneurs receive a positive non appropriable benefit M that can
be interpreted as positive net utility of being an entrepreneur as opposed to
being a worker.
2.2 Endowments
Agents are endowed with one unit of labour, entrepreneurial talent that is pri-
vate information of the agent, and illiquid wealth. Talent θ of an agent is the
probability of success of the more productive technology if she becomes an en-
trepreneur. θ is distributed with a cdf F (θ). Agents are endowed with illiquid
4
wealth a with a distribution G(a). We assume that the distribution of wealth
and talent is independent and that wealth is observable.
2.3 Occupational Choice
Agents choose their occupation. They can either choose to work in the subsis-
tence sector, become workers, or become entrepreneurs. They are paid a wage
w at the end of the period if they choose to work for a wage. If they choose
entrepreneurship, their payoff is stochastic. The project succeeds with a prob-
ability θ which is the unobservable talent of the agent. To set up a firm an
entrepreneur needs to hire n workers and pay them a wage w up front. Where
w ≥ w since working with the subsistence technology is an outside option that
all agents have.
Our assumption that the productive technology requires n workers and 1
entrepreneur implies that workers are the entrepreneur are perfect complements
in the production function. This assumption greatly simplifies our analysis and
allows us to get sharp political economy results though is not central to our
analysis.
2.4 Credit Market
Since the wealth of an agent is illiquid, agents need to borrow from the credit
market to become entrepreneurs. The credit market is perfectly competitive
and uses wealth to screen agents. It offers a contract which is a pair (r(a), a)
where a is the collateral and r(a) is the corresponding interest rate. However,
in this economy the protection of property rights may not be perfect. In par-
ticular all agents face a risk that their wealth a is expropriated by the state
with a probability τ where τ = 0 implies perfect protection of property rights.
Similarly, the enforcement of contracts in the economy may not be perfect ei-
ther, in particular, in case of failure of the project the bank can only recover a
proportion φ of the collateral from defaulters. Hence, given a collateral a the
interest rate is determined using the following zero profit condition:
r(a)nwθ + (1− θ)(1− τ)φa = nw (1)
For a loan to be viable the return from the project when it succeeds must
be large enough to pay the principal with the interest rate. This implies that
the following condition must also hold:
R− r(a)nw ≥ 0 (2)
This condition will define the credit constraint in the economy since there
will be a level of wealth below which the condition will not be satisfied. An
agent with wealth a and talent θ chooses entrepreneurship if:
θ(R− r(a)nw) +M − (1− τ)(1− θ)a > w (3)
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2.4.1 First Best
If talent was observable, the first best would be achieved and characterized by a
threshold θ∗ such that those with θ ≥ θ∗ become entrepreneurs and the others
become workers and earn w = w, where
θ∗ :
1∫
θ∗
f(θ)dθ =
1
n+ 1
(4)
and
w =
θ∗R+M
n+ 1
(5)
In the first best world, collateral would not be needed to screen agents.
Agents with talent θ ≥ θ∗ would be offered a contract with interest rate r = 1θ .
It follows that the value of φ will no longer matter. Similarly τ would simply be
a redistribution from the agents to the government and would have no efficiency
implications unlike the world where talent is unobservable.
Assumption: w > M > w.
M > w is necessary for the existence of a credit constraint in this economy.
If this were not true, looking at the occupational choice condition we can see
that agents would never want to borrow when R − rnw < 0 and consequently
there would never be a credit constraint.
In the first best, there would be no use for wealth and agents will get credit
at the interest rate r = 1/θ. Substituting this interest rate at θ∗ and plugging
in the value for w in equation (2) we find that w > M ensures that in the first
best the expected expropriable returns from projects that are funded are greater
than the size of the loan.
2.4.2 Pooling Contract
Any pooling contract that could be offered and accepted in equilibrium must
satisfy the necessary condition of zero profit for competitive banks:
rp(a)nwθp(a) + (1− θp(a))(1− τ)φa = nw (6)
where θp(a) is the average talent in the pool at wealth level a:
θp(a) =
∫ 1
θˆ(a)
θf(θ)dθ
1− F (θˆ(a)) (7)
and θˆ(a) is the agent with the lowest talent in the pool, who must be indifferent
between working for a wage and becoming an entrepreneur with the pooling
contract (rp(a), a). This is determined by:
θˆ(a)(R− rp(a)nw)− (1− τ)(1− θˆ(a))a+M = w (8)
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Plugging (7) in (6), the system of two equations (6) and (8) simultaneously
determines the pooling interest rate and the lower bound θˆ(a) of types that
could choose the pooling contract (rp(a), a) if they have wealth a. However,
there exists a lower bound of wealth below which banks are not willing to offer
such a contract: R must be greater than or equal to r(a)nw for banks to be
willing to lend. The lower bound on the collateral, ap, below which banks will
not find it profitable to lend, is obtained by solving the zero-profit condition at
R = r(a)nw:
ap =
nw − θp(ap)R
φ(1− τ)(1− θp(ap))
(9)
Substituting this into the occupational choice condition (8) of the marginal
agent who is indifferent, we find
θˆ(ap) =
w −M + (1− τ)ap
(1− τ)ap
(10)
This is the talent of the least talented entrepreneur in the pool at the lowest
level of wealth consistent with the pooling contract.
Lemma 1. The lower bound of talent in a pool at any given wealth class is
monotonically increasing in wealth.
Proof. Equation (8) implicitly defines θˆ(a). Totally differentiating this equation,
and rearranging we find:
dθˆ(a)
da
(
R− r(a)nw + (1− τ)a− θˆ(a)dr(a)
dθˆ
)
= (1−τ)
(
1− θˆ(a)
θp(a)
(θp(a) + (1− θp(a))φ)
)
(11)
R− r(a)nw ≥ 0 dr(a)
dθˆ
< 0 θˆ(a) < θp(a) (12)
Hence it must be true that:
dθˆ(a)
da
> 0 (13)
In words, starting from ap, an agent of a higher wealth class receives a lower
interest rate but has a greater loss in case of failure, and this second effect always
dominates for an agent at the bottom of the talent distribution that would be
choosing entrepreneurship at lower collateral levels. So the quality of the pool
of borrowers is the higher the higher the wealth class.
The maximum wealth level for which a pooling contract can be acceptable
is given by
a =
nw
(1− τ)φ (14)
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such that the pooling interest rate drops to 1. This is the level of collateral that
will be charged in a pooling contract when the interest rate equals one.
2.4.3 Separating Contract
A separating contract exists if the contract is such that agents have an incentive
to reveal their types. Just like in the case of the pooling contract, we can use
the zero profit condition, the feasibility condition for the loan, and the agent’s
occupational choice condition to find the lowest level of talent and collateral
that is consistent with a separating contract. These are:
θs =
nw − φ(M − w)
R
(15)
as =
(M − w)R
(1− τ)(R− nw + φ(M − w)) (16)
The existence of the separating contract depends on the existence of a type
dependent collateral schedule that is implementable. In other words, letting θ˜
be the type that an agent declares in a direct mechanism, if we can find a sched-
ule of collateral a(θ˜) such that agents find it optimal to declare their true types
(θ˜ = θ), then (rs(θ˜, a(θ˜)), a(θ˜)) is a separating contract. Given a certain repre-
sentation that is possible here, this problem boils down to checking whether the
following three conditions hold: the single crossing condition, monotonicity, and
the local incentive compatibility constraint (Bolton and Dewatripont (2005)).
The representation is the following:
vθ = θq(θ)− T (θ) +M (17)
where
q = R− rs(a)nw + a(1− τ) (18)
and
T = (1− τ)a (19)
Given this representation of the problem it is easy to check that the single
crossing property holds. The single crossing property states that the slope of
the indifference curve of an agent defined over the quantity she consumes and
the transfer she makes to the principal is monotonic in her type. This ensures
that the indifference curves of agents with different types intersect only once.
Mathematically:
∂
∂θ
(
− ∂v/∂q
∂v/∂T
)
> 0 (20)
It is trivial to show that this is satisfied.
It is optimal for an agent of type θ with wealth a to declare her type truthfully
if:
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argmax
θ˜
vθ(θ˜) = θ (21)
where
vθ(θ˜) = θ
(
R− r(θ˜, a(θ˜))nw + (1− τ)a(θ˜)
)
− (1− τ)a(θ˜) +M (22)
The first order condition for this problem evaluated at θ˜ = θ is:
nw
θ˜(1− θ˜)(1− τ)(1− φ) −
a(θ˜)φ
θ˜(1− θ˜)(1− φ) − a
′(θ˜) = 0 (23)
solving this differential equation for a(θ˜) we find that:
a(θ˜) =
nw
φ(1− τ)
1 + C (1− θ˜
θ˜
) φ
1−φ
 (24)
where C is the constant of integration. Since lower bound values of θ˜ = θs and
a(θ˜) = as we can solve for the particular solution.
a(θ˜) =
nw
φ(1− τ)
1− (R− nw)
nw
(
θs
1− θs
) 1
1−φ
(
1− θ˜
θ˜
) φ
1−φ
 (25)
The second order condition for this problem is:
− 1
θ2
(nw − φ(1− τ)a(θ))− 2φ(1− τ)
θ
a′(θ)−a′′(θ)(1−τ)(1−θ)(1−φ) < 0 (26)
It is easy to check that this equation always holds, and hence the function is
globally concave. Lastly, the condition of monotonicity implies that q(θ) should
be increasing in θ. This is required since high types derive more value from
entrepreneurship and hence their payoff in the event of success should be more
attractive to them than success when choosing the payoff offered to the low
types4. It is easy to check that R − r(a(θ))nw + (1− τ)a(θ) is increasing in θ.
This is because a(θ˜) is monotonically increasing in θ˜. High types post higher
collateral since the value that an entrepreneur places on the reduction in the
interest rate relative to the increase in collateral is increasing in her type. When
the type of the agent is the highest possible, that is, θ = 1, the corresponding
collateral is a and the interest rate charged is 1 (the same as in the case of the
pooling contract). Hence a competitive separating contract exists.
4For simplicity we call agents with talent θ < θ∗ low types and agents with talent θ ≥ θ∗
high types.
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3 Equilibrium
3.1 Equilibrium in the Credit Market
We have shown that both pooling and separating contracts are viable. Given
that banks can introduce any contract (r(a), a) we will now characterise the equi-
librium in the model. We will use the Rothschild Stiglitz equilibrium concept
where an equilibrium is characterised by i) all the contracts in the equilibrium
set make non negative profits and ii) non existence of a contract that can be
introduced that will make a strictly positive profit. We will assume that ap > 0.
It is easy to check that ap < as < a. Hence there is no contract that can be
offered to (and accepted by) an agent with wealth a < ap that will make non
negative profits.
Lemma 2. There exists a level of wealth aˆp defined by θs = θˆ(aˆp) where a >
aˆp > as such that the only contract in the equilibrium set for a < aˆp can be a
pooling contract.
Proof. Recall that θˆ(a) is the level of talent such that an agent with this
talent is indifferent between becoming an entrepreneur with the pooling con-
tract (rp(a), a) and working for a wage. Since the distribution of wealth is
continuous, there exists a level of wealth aˆp such that an agent with talent
θs = θˆ(aˆp) is indifferent between both these alternatives and the separating
contract (r(a(θs)), a(θs)). At as the agent with type θs prefers the pooling to
the separating contract since she receives a cross subsidy. At aˆp the attractive-
ness of the cross subsidy disappears since the collateral requirement becomes
too high. Hence even though a separating contract is feasible at as it is not in-
centive compatible for an agent with type θs to accept it. It becomes incentive
compatible only when the agent has wealth a ≥ aˆp at which point he prefers
(rs(a(θs)), a(θs) to (rp(aˆp), aˆp))
Lemma 3. In the region of wealth a ∈ (aˆp, a) there exists a level of talent θˆs(a)
such that agents with talent θ > θˆs(a) prefer the pooling contract and agents
with talent θ ≤ θˆs(a) prefer the separating contract.
Proof. Note that for a ∈ (aˆp, a) a fully separating contract schedule is not
available since the collateral required for full separation of types is a. ∂θˆ(a)∂a
implies that the attractiveness of the pooling contract is increasing in type.
This is obvious since it simply captures the fact that more wealth is better
for screening than less. This implies the existence of a cutoff talent θˆs(a) for
level of wealth a ≥ aˆp such that it becomes possible to offer agents with talent
θ ≤ θˆs(a) a separating contract that they prefer to the pooling contract. Note
that θˆs(aˆp) = θˆ(aˆp) = θs and θˆs(a) = 1
Proposition 1 (Existence and Uniqueness). A unique credit market equilibrium
exists such that agents with wealth a:
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• a ≥ a: are offered separating contracts
• a > a > aˆp: are offered both pooling and separating contract
• aˆp > a > ap: are offered pooling contracts
• ap > a: are credit constrained
Proof. a < ap are credit constrained since no contract that makes non negative
profits can be offered to these agents. Lemma 2 shows that only a pooling
contract can exist in the region of wealth a < aˆp. Lemma 3 shows that in the
region of wealth a > a > aˆp agents with talent θ ≤ θˆs(a) a separating contract
and θ > θˆs(a) accept a pooling contract. For the region of wealth a ≥ a a fully
separating schedule of contract exists that is offered and accepted by agents.
This is a unique equilibrium since the zero profit pooling and separating contract
schedules are unique.
Proposition 2 (Occupational Choice). Agents with wealth:
• ap > a become workers
• aˆp > a ≥ ap and talent θ ≥ θˆ(a) accept the pooling contract and become
entrepreneurs and the rest become workers
• a > a > aˆp and talent 1 ≥ θ > θˆs(a) accept the pooling contract and
become entrepreneurs; and talent θˆs(a)) ≥ θ ≥ θs accept the separating
contract and become entrepreneurs, and the rest become workers
• a ≥ a and talent θ ≥ θs accept the separating contract and become en-
trepreneurs and the rest become workers
Proof. Follows from Lemma 1 and Proposition 1
3.2 Equilibrium in the Labour Market
The labour market is perfectly competitive. An equilibrium is characterised by
the demand equalling supply. It is much easier to characterise the equilibrium
by thinking of the labour demand of a firm instead of the labour demand by
an entrepreneur. A firm demands 1 unit of entrepreneurial and n units of non
entrepreneurial labour. Supply is 0 for wage w < w, and 1 at w = w. Labour
demand is given by:
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Ld = (n+ 1)
(∫ aˆp
ap
(
1− F (θˆ(a))
)
g(a)da+ (1− F (θs))(1−G(aˆp))
)
(27)
Proposition 3. The equilibrium wage is w when Ld(w) ≤ 1 w > w when
Ld(w) > 1
Proof. Note that Labour demand is monotonically decreasing in the wage:
∂Ld
∂w
= (n+1)
−g(ap)∂ap∂w (1− F (θp))− f(θs)∂θs∂w (1−G(aˆp))−
aˆp∫
ap
f(θˆ(a))
∂θˆ(a)
∂w
g(a)da
 < 0
(28)
since
∂ap
∂w
> 0
∂θs
∂w
> 0
∂θˆ(a)
∂w
> 0 (29)
If Labour demand is less than 1, there is excess supply of labour in the
economy and the wage must equal w which is the outside option to working for
a wage. If the labour demanded at w = w is more that 1, then the economy is
tight in the sense that no one is engaged in the subsistence sector, and the wage
must increase to equilibriate demand and supply.
Note that in this economy M > w is necessary and sufficient for there to
be a credit constraint. If the equilibrium wage rises above this then the bank’s
zero profit condition is satisfied even at 0 wealth. We will assume that the
equilibrium wage is lower than M since the problem without credit constraint
is not interesting to analyse.5
4 Institutions
The argument that we make in this paper is that when an imperfect market
creates interest groups, then the political choices made by the electorate are
affected. In the first best where talent is observable, the best institutions are
chosen. As we move away from the first best world, there is not only a mar-
ket inefficiency created by the non observability of talent, but also a political
inefficiency created by the electorate voting in favour of inefficient institutions.
The parameter τ captures how poor the enforcement of property rights is.
A high τ implies that law enforcement is poor and assets are likely to be stolen
by thieves or taken over by the local strongman. Hence a straightforward way
to think about τ is how tough government is on property related crime and
how well it enforces the claims of someone dispossessed of their property. Less
5It should be noted that in contrast to Ghatak et al. (2007) there are no multiple equilibria
since firm level labour demand is constant at n.
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violently, τ can also be thought of as how well the titling system works. To the
extent it is easy to bribe the local bureaucrat to get the names on the land titles
changed, τ would be high and vice versa.
The treatment of φ is somewhat different since it is the proportion of col-
lateralized wealth that can be liquidated in real terms. Hence (1 − φ) is pure
inefficiency and consequently there is a strong case for thinking that φ = 1 will
be the surplus maximising policy. We find that under certain conditions, this
effect may be dominated through the inefficiencies caused in the occupational
choices due to a high φ since a high φ can end up making entrepreneurship too
attractive.
In our model (1 − τ) and φ are two parameters that capture the strength
of property rights and contractual institutions respectively. The most plausible
way to think about these are that these are parameters that capture institutional
frictions that reduce the efficiency of market transactions involving wealth.
This can be illustrated with the following example. To fix ideas let us think
of wealth as land. Consider a scenario where there’s an agent who wishes to
rent out his land. This landlord would consider two things when entering into a
rental contract with a potential tenant. Firstly he would consider how secure his
property rights are. When τ is high, the landlord realises that his property rights
over the land he is renting out are not very secure. This dampens the incentives
for renting the land since the landlord worries about a potential capture by the
tenant.
Independently, a low φ implies that enforcement of contracts is costly. The
landlord anticipates that in the event a tenant refuses to vacate the land as
per the terms of the rental contract, the landlord would need to approach the
courts for enforcement of his contractual rights. Even if property rights are
fully secure, if φ is low, the court costs would be substantial. Therefore a low φ
would also dampen the incentives to put land to its productive use.
The distinction between the two institutions is heuristic.6 In most applica-
tions one can think of, φ and τ would interact together creating aggregate trans-
action costs that would dampen the incentives for market transactions involving
wealth. For example in the model presented here, both enter multiplicatively
when agents post their wealth as collateral to become entrepreneurs. The credit
market takes into account both the insecurity of the property right over the
collateral and the costs of enforcing the credit contract in case of default.
In the first best when talent in observable, the preferences of the electorate
are unanimously aligned with surplus maximisation. Hence a τ = 0 is cho-
sen because better property rights increase the expected payoff of all agents.
Similarly the optimal φ would be chosen to the extent there are any contrac-
6In Besley (1995) three channels through which property rights affects investment incen-
tives are laid out. These are the security of tenure, the use of property as collateral, and the
benefits of gains from trade. Of these we feel that the first and the third are channels through
which τ would affect investment incentives whereas the second channel relating to the use of
land as collateral is affected by an interaction of τ and φ as is the case in the model. Of course
wealth in our model is exogenous and therefore the issue of investment incentives does not
arise.
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tual transactions involving wealth.7 As soon as there’s a departure from the
first best, the inefficiency of the market gets further amplified by the choices of
the electorate that are governed by the class structure created in the inefficient
market.
The best institutions are the ones that maximise the total surplus in the
economy which in this model happens when the most talented agents become
entrepreneurs regardless of their wealth. This is equivalent to the quality of the
pool of entrepreneurs being maximised. Under the first best the total surplus
in the economy is:
Wfb = (R+M)
1∫
θ∗
θf(θ)dθ +
∞∫
0
(1− τ)ag(a)d(a) (30)
By inspecting this expression it is clear that the total surplus is decreasing in
τ . Since all agents lose a part of their wealth as τ increases, agents unanimously
vote for τ equal to zero. Since collateral is not posted in this economy, there is
no loss of efficiency due to φ.
In the second best world with unobservable talent, the total surplus is:
Wsb = (R+M)
 aˆp∫
ap
1∫
θˆ(a)
θf(θ)g(a)dθda+
∞∫
aˆp
1∫
θs
θf(θ)g(a)dθda
 (31)
+w
1− (n+ 1) aˆp∫
ap
(1− F (θˆ(a)))g(a)da+ (1− F (θs))(1−G(aˆp))

∞∫
0
(1−τ)ag(a)d(a)+φ
 aˆp∫
ap
1∫
θˆ(a)
a(1− θ)f(θ)g(a)dθda+
∞∫
aˆp
1∫
θs
a(1− θ)f(θ)g(a)dθda

In this economy there are two productive activities: the subsistence sector
where a worker produces w and the hi tech sector where n workers and 1 en-
trepreneur produce R+M . The wage paid to the worker in the hi tech sector is
simply a transfer from the entrepreneur to the worker which doesn’t enter the
total surplus. In the world with full information, the first best is guaranteed,
where all agents are engaged in the hi tech sector either as a worker or en-
trepreneurs. This is what equation (30) captures. In the second best world this
is no longer true. The mass of agents engaged in the hi tech sector is n+1 times
the mass of entrepreneurs. The rest of the agents engage in the subsistence
sector where they produce w. This is captured in the second part of equation
(31) which takes a positive value when w = w and 0 otherwise.
7Note that in the first best in our model there are no contractual transactions involving
wealth since talent is observable and wealth has no use as a screen. Hence all values of φ are
optimal in the first best world.
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The third part of the expression captures the loss of wealth when τ is greater
than 0. Similarly when φ is less than one there is some loss of collateral in case
of default.
The first best could be achieved if ap = 0 and θˆ(a) = θs = θ
∗. In such a
case none of the agents in the economy are engaged in the subsistence sector
and hence the second term in the expression drops out.
It is easy to see why the first best is never possible when talent is unobserv-
able. Even when there is no credit constraint, at low enough levels of wealth,
separation is not possible. At the bottom of the wealth distribution where a = 0,
the credit market can only offer a pooling contract. With a pooling contract at
a = 0, the talent of the least talented agent that chooses entrepreneurship is al-
ways lower than θ∗ since θ∗ is the talent of the least talented agent that accepts
her actuarially fair contract in the full information case. Since the least talented
agent receives a cross subsidy with the pooling contract but not a separating
contract, the talent of the marginal agent with 0 wealth is lower when talent is
unobservable. But since the mass of entrepreneurs is bounded at 1n+1 , and at
the lower end of the wealth distribution agents with talent less than θ∗ are en-
trepreneurs, then at wealth a ≥ aˆp, θs must be greater than θ∗. That is, agents
that would become entrepreneurs in the first best world, choose to work for a
wage. This drives the inefficiency in the model. If credit constraint exists then
there is the added inefficiency of agents with high talent but low wealth that
are excluded from entrepreneurship. The first best can only be replicated in the
world with incomplete information if all agents have sufficient wealth and can be
offered a separating contract. Therefore if the average wealth in this economy
is greater than the threshold level of wealth required for separation, a policy
of redistribution can restore full efficiency in this economy. If the total level of
wealth is insufficient or if the instruments for conducting such a redistribution
are unavailable then there will always be some inefficiency since there would at
the same time be agents with talent less than θ∗ who choose entrepreneurship
and talent greater than θ∗ that choose working for a wage.
Given this discussion, it is possible to envisage distributions of wealth and
talent such that there exists a non zero “natural level of credit constraint”. That
is, the total surplus may not always be maximised when the credit constraint
is pushed down. Though reducing the credit constraint allows agents with low
wealth to become entrepreneurs, this has an effect through the labour market
of increasing the wage. Increasing the wage may in turn reduce the number of
high type entrepreneurs with high wealth.
To discuss whether endogenous institutions can bring the economy in the
direction of higher welfare or not, suppose that all agents can vote in a binary
election between a status quo institution (status quo φ or τ) and an alternative.
When faced with a binary choice, each agent votes sincerely.
One obvious remark we will make, without making distributional assump-
tions, is that an alternative policy that is aimed at maximising total surplus
may not win when put to majority vote. This result in itself is not particularly
surprising. Since redistributive instruments are lacking it is to be expected that
agents inefficiently use institutions to redistribute rather than to maximise sur-
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plus. Indeed such a choice of institutions is not inefficient in the paretian sense.
What is interesting here however is that the alignment of interest groups is itself
created by the existence of market failure and this alignment takes the economy
away even from the second best world with market failures. In other words, the
inefficiency of market failure is further amplified by the political alignments it
creates.
The cornerstone to understanding why agents choose non surplus maximising
institutions is the following: in this economy there are always at least nn+1
workers. Since n ≥ 1, a policy that increases wage has support of at least
half the population. However policies that increase wage may not increase the
quality of the pool of entrepreneurs. This is the insight that we will use to
generate the results in the rest of this section. Thus efficient institutions are
those that increase the quality of the pool of entrepreneurs whereas institutions
that increase wage are politically feasible.
4.1 Support for improvement in judicial enforcement
The parameter φ in the model denotes the amount of collateral that banks can
liquidate in case of default and is the parameter that denotes the quality of the
judiciary. Instead of a cost that is proportional to the collateral in dispute, the
quality of the judiciary could be modelled as a fixed cost that need to be paid
for approaching the judiciary. In such a model φ would be a fixed cost and
interest rate would instead be determined by the following zero profit condition:
r(a)nwθ + ((1− τ)a− φ)(1− θ) = nw (32)
The idea we wish to capture with φ is the efficiency of the judiciary in
expropriating assets of a defaultor and handing them over to the creditor at the
least possible cost. This idea is captured in both these formulations. Given the
discussion on efficiency and political feasibility, we have:
Proposition 4. A policy aimed at increasing φ is guaranteed majority support
but may not always be surplus maximising.
Proof. There are two parts to this proposition. The first part is that a policy
of increasing φ is guaranteed majority support. This is proven in the appendix.
The second part is that such a policy is not guaranteed to be surplus maximis-
ing. This is proven by construction of an example in the final extension where
increasing φ reduces total surplus.
The intuition for the result is the following. It is easy to show that the
equilibrium wage is non decreasing in φ, and hence the proposal for increasing
φ is supported by the majority. However, total surplus may not be increasing in
φ since the effect of an increase in φ on the quality of the pool of entrepreneurs
is ambiguous.
This result is quite striking when contrasted against the standard intuition
about contracting institutions. Here improving the quality of contracting in-
stitutions (increasing φ) is not always good since that makes entrepreneurship
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more attractive and this induces low types to become entrepreneurs. This result
arises because there are inherent externalities when agents borrow money: the
low type entrepreneurs by their very existence impose an externality on the high
types. Our result can be easily understood when seen in the light of the theory
of second best.
4.2 Support for improvement in property rights
The agents face a risk of expropriation. With a probability τ their wealth
is expropriated. This has an effect on occupational choice since the risk of
expropriation reduces the value of wealth as collateral. This in turn makes
entrepreneurship more attractive since agents do not place as much weight on
default and consequent loss of collateral.
The political support for a change in τ is ambiguous since the effect on wage
is ambiguous. We can see this from the following:
∂Ld
∂τ
: (n+1)
−g(ap)∂ap∂τ (1− F (θp))− f(θs)∂θs∂τ (1−G(aˆp))−
aˆp∫
ap
f(θˆ(a))
∂θˆ(a)
∂τ
g(a)da

(33)
The sign of this expression is ambiguous. This is because:
∂ap
∂τ
> 0
∂θs
∂τ
= 0
∂θˆ(a)
∂τ
< 0 (34)
∂ap
∂τ
=
(
nw−θp(ap)R
φ(1−τ)2(1−θp(ap))
)
− ∂θp(ap)∂τ |ap
(
R−nw
φ(1−τ)(1−θp(ap))2
)
1 +
∂θp(ap)
∂ap
(
R−nw
φ(1−τ)(1−θp(ap))2
) > 0 (35)
since
∂θp
∂τ
|ap = −
M − w
(1− τ)2ap
< 0 (36)
The credit constraint is increasing in τ . When τ increases, the effective
wealth of an agent decreases, and the interest rate at all levels of wealth in-
creases. This is intuitive since an increase in τ decreases the value of wealth
as a screen. Since agents are likely to have their wealth expropriated anyway,
posting a high collateral is less effective in revealing an agent’s type. Take the
limiting case where τ goes close to 1, in this case, the credit market correctly
anticipates that all agents are equally eager to post any collateral since they
know that their wealth will be expropriated and hence don’t attach any value
on recovery of collateral in the event of success and consequent repayment of
the loan.
There are two opposing effects on wage of an decrease in τ . Firstly decreas-
ing τ reduces the level of credit constraint. This increases the number of en-
trepreneurs. Decreasing τ also decreases the attractiveness of entrepreneurship
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for marginal agents (θˆ(a)), who were previously accepting the pooling contract
to become entrepreneurs due to the cross subsidy from higher types within their
wealth level. Since there are two opposite effects on wage, the precise effect on
total surplus of a change in τ would depend on the assumptions on the distri-
bution of wealth and talent. However in case these two effects exactly cancel
each other out, it is possible then to characterise the effect on total surplus.
Proposition 5. If the wage remains unchanged as a result of a change in τ ,
then decreasing (increasing) τ increases (decreases) total surplus
Proof. If wage remains unchanged as a result of a decrease in τ then the new
equilibrium pareto dominates the previous equilibrium. All agents who remain
workers are unaffected, all entrepreneurs are made better off due to a reduction
in the interest rate. Additionally there are agents who were previously credit
constrained who can now become entrepreneurs for whom the policy is a strict
improvement over status quo. Since it is a pareto improvement, it must also
increase total surplus. Similarly if an increase in τ keeps the wage unchanged,
it must reduce the total surplus since workers are unaffected, entrepreneurs
are made worse off due to the increase in the interest rate, and there are at
least some agents who are denied credit as a result of the increase in the credit
constraint who are made strictly worse off.
By continuity we can extend this proposition to mean that if the change in
wage as a result of an improvement in property rights is small enough, then
total surplus must have increased. It is possible to push this result further.
Proposition 6. If the change in wage as a result of improvement (deteriora-
tion) in property right is negative (positive) then total surplus must increase
(decrease).
Proof. Note first that the average quality of the pool of entrepreneurs is a suf-
ficient statistic for gauging changes in total surplus. If the wage decreases as
a result of an decrease in τ , it must be the case that the effect on labour de-
mand through θˆ(a) dominates the reduction in the credit constraint. Now note
that the average talent at the lowest level of wealth where a pooling contract is
offered (ap) is lower than the average talent of the pool. This is true because
the distribution of wealth and talent are independent and the talent of the least
talented agent within a wealth level is increasing in wealth.
Now note that is always possible to construct a distribution of wealth such
that the pre reform average talent is the same but post reform the credit con-
straint is relaxed more to the extent that the two opposing effects on wage cancel
each other out and wage remains unchanged. In this case, the average talent
post reform would be lower than the case where the wage went down. However,
given the previous result, the total surplus would still increase. Since the initial
average quality of the pool of entrepreneurs is the same by construction, this
implies that the ex post level of talent must have increased in the case where
the wage decreases.
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This result brings into sharp relief the trade-off between political feasibil-
ity and efficiency of institutional reform. Only reforms that increase wages are
politically feasible but these may not correspond to reforms that are surplus
maximising. In case of property rights institutions, when reforming them (de-
creasing τ) has an unambiguous impact on the total surplus, they are politically
unfeasible because they end up reducing the wage.
5 Extension: Discrete Types
We now assume that the distribution of talent is discrete. This makes the
characterisation of efficient policy more straightforward. In particular with such
a distribution, it is always surplus maximising to relax the credit constraint
since, unlike in the continuous case, there is a clearly defined ’high type’, that
always chooses entrepreneurship when given access to credit. In the case with
the continuous distribution, there is an inefficiency from increased wage on the
occupational choice of a rich agent with high talent who would have been an
entrepreneur in the first best world with complete information but who chooses
working for a wage due to the requirement of posting collateral. In the world
with a discrete distribution of talent, this effect is absent.
Proportion q of the agents are high types who succeed with probability 1.
The rest (1 − q) are low types who succeed with probability θ < 1. We make
the following assumptions:
θ(R− nw) +M > w > θR− nw +M (37)
This assumption guarantees that even when wage is at it’s subsistence level,
low types prefer not to become entrepreneurs if they have to finance their invest-
ment themselves but prefer to be entrepreneurs when they are financed by banks
and have only limited liability to pay back the loan. In this model since there are
only two possible realisations of output {0, R}, limited liability translates to the
loan being repaid only when the project succeeds (outcome R). This greatly
simplifies the characterisation of the total surplus. Since types are discreet,
the quality of the pool of entrepreneurs is maximised when all entrepreneurs
are high types. Since high types always value entrepreneurship more than low
types, lowering the credit constraint increases surplus. This is because increas-
ing the number of entrepreneurs leads to an increase in wage. This induces
low types with high wealth to become workers. Since the size of the pool is
constant, lowering the credit constraint implies the increase in the proportion of
high types. The following assumption ensures that the proportion of high types
in the population is large enough such that it the credit constraint is completely
relaxed, the economy would reach the surplus maximising outcome.
q ≥ 1
1 + n
(38)
In other words with these assumptions, the credit constraint becomes a suf-
ficient statistic for gauging the efficiency in this economy.
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5.1 Supply of Credit
R− rnw ≥ 0 (39)
This equation always holds as it ensures that the returns from the project
are large enough to payback loan with interest. Banks would never offer a credit
contract where this condition did not hold. Hence this equation, when satisfied
by an equality defines a credit constraint in the sense that if there exists an
agent to whom banks cannot offer a low enough interest rate that satisfies this
equation, then no credit will be offered to such an agent. If the equilibrium is
pooling, the zero profit condition in the credit market is:
rp(a) {q + (1− q)θ}nw + (1− q)(1− θ)φa = nw (40)
It can be seen that:
drp(a)
da
< 0 (41)
By substituting the equation for r(a) from (41) into (40) it follows that:
a = max
{
nw −R[q + (1− q)θ]
φ(1− q)(1− θ) , 0
}
(42)
where a is the lowest level of wealth that can sustain a pooling equilibrium
while maintaining zero profits for the bank. This implies that in a pooling
equilibrium, banks will not lend to agents with wealth a < a.
5.2 Demand for Credit
vH(a, r, w) = R− rnw +M (43)
vL(a, r, w) = θ(R− rnw) +M − (1− θ)a (44)
High types always derive greater value from entrepreneurship than low types
implying that vH(a, r, w) ≥ vL(a, r, w) always holds when high and low types
are offered the same credit contract and so this is also true in the special case
when the pooling interest rate is offered. We can therefore focus on low types.
It is easy to check that in the pooling equilibrium:
∂vPL (a, rp(a), w)
∂a
< 0 (45)
The intuition for this is straighforward. Poorer low types are more inclined
to be entrepreneurs than richer low types since they have less to lose in terms of
collateral they post when borrowing. This is because poor low type borrowers
are cross subsidised more heavily by poor high type borrowers than rich low type
borrowers are by rich high type borrowers. It is interesting to note that cross
subsidisation in this model is always across type but within the same level of
wealth since the level of wealth is observable. More generally, the classic negative
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externality created by adverse selection operates within the same wealth level
in this model. This feature of the model turns out to be important in creating
different constituencies across wealth and ability that have differing interests in
mitigating or worsening the problem of unobservability of types.
Since it is never optimal for low types to self finance their projects, there
exists a level of wealth aˆ such that the cross subsidisation for low types with
greater wealth is not enough to induce them to choose entrepreneurship. Low
types with wealth a ≥ aˆ prefer being workers rather than borrowing at the
pooling interest rate and posting the corresponding collateral. Hence aˆ is the
level of wealth such that the following condition holds:
w = vPL (aˆ, rp(aˆ), w) (46)
and solving this out we find:
aˆ =
[
θ {(q + (1− q)θ)R− nw}
(q + (1− q)θ) +M − w
]
1
(1− θ) {q + (1− φ)(1− q)θ} (47)
Note that the equilibrium in the credit market for wealth a ≥ aˆ cannot be
fully seperating for wealth levels close enough to aˆ. This is true because given
we have assumed 0 profits for banks, a fully seperating equilibrium must entail
an interest rate of 1 since a pool of high types repays loans with probability
1. However a discontinuity in the rate of interest charged, from r(aˆ) >> 1 for
a = aˆ to r(a) = 1 for a > aˆ cannot be an equilibrium since this would attract
low types into back into entrepreneurship for wealth a = aˆ due to the continuity
of vL. And hence it will not be an equilibrium for banks to charge interest rate
r = 1 at wealth a = aˆ.
To ensure an equilibrium, we assume that when indifferent, low types ran-
domise between entrepreneurship and working for a wage. This implies a region
of wealth within which a semi-separating equilibrium operates. With probabil-
ity λ(a) a low type agent with wealth a chooses entrepreneurship. To determine
λ(a) first note that the semi separating interest rate rs(a) is defined by:
vL(a, rs(a), w) = w (48)
which yields the following expression for rs(a) :
rs(a) =
θR+M − w − (1− θ)a
nwθ
(49)
which is decreasing in wealth. Therefore moving upward on the distribution
of wealth, there exists a wealth level a > aˆ such that low types with wealth
a ≥ a do not borrow even when the interest rate is 1. The semi-separating
equilibrium with the interest rate rs(a) operates between wealth aˆ and a such
that a contract (a, (rs(a)) maintains the indifference of the low types between
entrepreneurship and working for a wage. Since the indifference of the low
types is maintained with (a, rs(a)) and working for a wage is strictly preferred
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to the pooling contract (a, rp(a)), this implies that rp(a) > rs(a) for a > aˆ
and rp(aˆ) = rs(aˆ). Such an interest rate in equilibrium when low types choose
entrepreneurship with probability λ needs to satisfy the following zero profit
condition:{
q + (1− q)θλ(a)
q + (1− q)λ(a)
}
rs(a)nw +
{
(1− q)(1− θ)λ(a)
q + (1− q)λ(a)
}
φa = nw (50)
and this equation uniquely determines λ.
To sum up, at a givel level of wealth a such that aˆL ≤ a ≤ a banks choose
an interest rate rs(a) that makes the low types indifferent between working
for a wage and entrepreneurship. This interest rate is unique since vL(r, a, w)
is monotonically decreasing in r (and the Leontief technology rules out any
intensive margin effect on wages). When subjected to the zero profit condition,
this interest rate uniquely determines a probability λ that when used by low
types to randomise between entrepreneurship and working for a wage, the zero
profit condition of the bank holds. Hence the strategy rs(a) for banks and λ(a)
for low type with wealth a is the unique nash equilibrium. At a, λ = 0 and the
interest rate banks charge equals 1 since the pool of borrowers is composed only
of high types at a ≥ a.
a =
θ(R− nw) +M − w
(1− θ) (51)
Similarly at aˆ, λ = 1 since this is the highest level of wealth consistent with
a pooling contract. Substituting for rs(a) using (12) into (13) we can see that:
dλ(a)
da
< 0 (52)
This implies that as the level of wealth increases, for the semi-separating
contract to be consistent with the zero profit condition, λ must decrease in
wealth.
5.3 Equilibrium in Credit Market
Proposition 7. Agents with wealth a ≥ a are always offered the separating
contract (a, 1).
Proof. Assume a contract (a, r′) exists that dominates (a, 1).For this to be true
r′ < 1 must be true since at a given wealth level the contract with the lowest
interest rate dominates. The bank that offers this contract makes losses since
the opportunity cost of capital is 1, and hence, this contract will not be offered.
But this is a contradiction.
Lemma 4. If aˆ < a < a then there exists an aˆ such that R− rs(aˆ)nw = 0 and
aˆ < aˆ < a
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Proof. By definition of aˆ and a : R = rs(aˆ)nw = rp(a)nw.Since rs(a) <
rp(a),and both interest rates are decreasing in a, aˆ < a.
To show aˆ < aˆ note that both rp(a) and rs(a) are decreasing in wealth.
Also note rs(aˆL) = rp(aˆL) > rp(a). But since rˆ(aˆ) = r(a) = Rnw by definition,
this implies aˆ > aˆL. To see that aˆ < a note that rˆ(a) < r(a) for a > aˆL.This
implies that if rs(aˆ) = rp(a) then aˆ < a. Hence aˆL < aˆ < a. Explicitly aˆ =
max
{
0,
M − w
(1− θ)
}
Proposition 8. A credit market equilibrium exists such that:
i) If a < aˆ < a then agents with wealth a where aˆ ≤ a < a are offered
the semi-seperating contract (a, rs(a)) , agents with wealth a where a < a < aˆ
receive a pooling contract (a, rp(a)), and agents with wealth a < a get no credit.
ii) If aˆ < a < a then agents with wealth a where aˆ ≤ a < a and are offered the
semi-seperating contract (a, rs(a)), and agents with wealth a < aˆ get no credit.
Proof. i)
Consider the semi-seperating case where aˆ ≤ a < a. By the same argument
that was used to prove proposition 1, it is clear that for a contract (a, r′) to
dominate (a, rs(a)), r′ < rs(a). By definition rs(a) is the interest rate that
ensures vL(rs(a), w) = w. Hence (a, r′) is accepted by all the high and low
types with wealth a. By revealed preference low types strictly prefer (a, r′)
to (a, rs(a)) which is the zero profit semi-seperating contract that they are
indifferent to. Since for a given wealth level and pool of borrowers the profit
function of the bank is monotonically increasing in the interest rate it follows
that (a, r′) makes losses. But since it makes losses (a, r′) will never be offered.
Consider the pooling case where a < a < aˆ. Note that high types strictly
prefer any reduction in the interest rate for an increase in collateral, hence at
a given wealth level a, collateral equals a.Therefore a contract (a, r′) where
r′ > rp(a) has no takers. If r′ < rp(a), it is accepted by everyone but makes
losses since it undercuts (a, rp(a)), the zero profit contract . Hence it will not
be offered.
Consider the case where a < a, since at this level of wealth seperation is not
possible and the pooling contract makes losses, no contract can be introduced
that makes positive profits.
ii)
If aˆL < a then by Lemma 2 there must exist an aˆ such that R = rs(aˆ)nw.
Hence a contract offered to agents with wealth a < aˆ makes losses. By the same
argument used in i), for the wealth level a such that aˆ ≤ a < a the only interest
rate compatible with equilibrium is rs(a).
Hence under parameter values 0 < a < aˆL < a∗, which is the richest case,
the poorest (a < a) are credit constrained, the lower middle classes(a < a < aˆL)
get pooling contracts where interest rates are high but decreasing in wealth due
to presence of low types in the pool of entrepreneurs. In the pooling contracts,
low types choose to become entrepreneurs with probability 1. At a higher point
in the wealth distribution (aˆL < a < a∗) the proportion of low types that
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borrow becomes lower. In particular low types borrow with probability λ which
is decreasing in wealth and at some point at high enough wealth (a ≥ a∗) this
probability drops to zero. The rich therefore get fully seperating contract with
interest rate 1 since their wealth in form of collateral immunises them from any
ill effect of adverse selection.
Lemma 5. a ≥ a is never true. Hence, if there are credit constraints, then
there must be regions of wealth where the credit contract that is offerred is semi-
separating.
Proof. a ≥ a implies that R − nw ≤ 0. But by assumption 1 this is never true
for wage w ≤ w
5.4 Equilibrium in the Labour Market
The Labour Markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive. Labour Supply
is 0 for wage lower than w and 1 for any wage w ≥ w. Labour demand is given
by:
(1 + n)
q(1−G(a)) + (1− q)
(G(aˆL)−G(a)) +
a∗∫
aˆL
λ(a)g(a)da

 (53)
if a < aˆL < a∗ and
(1 + n)
q{1−G(aˆ)}+ (1− q) a
∗∫
aˆ
λ(a)g(a)da
 (54)
if aˆL < a < a∗
Note that whenever w > w, this implies that the economy is tight in the
sense that there is no subsistence sector. The number of entrepreneurs (work-
ers) in such an economy is 1n+1
(
n
n+1
)
. After this point since the number of
entrepreneurs cannot rise, the increase in wage can only come from the increase
in the quality of the pool of entrepreneurs when low types are substituted for
high types. Conversely, any policy that reduces the number of entrepreneurs
and hence leads to the creation of the subsistence sector.
In the corner case where w = w, high types are indifferent between working
for a wage and becoming entrepreneurs. It will typically not be an equilibrium
for all of them to choose entrepreneurship or woking for a wage. In this case
the equilibrium will be in mixed strategies.
Lemma 6. If w = w then high types must choose entrepreneurship (working for
a wage) with probability p (1− p) where p = 1
q(n+ 1)
for equilibrium to exist.
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Proof. Note that w = w implies that q ≥ 1n+1 . To see this note 2 things:
1. Define vH(1, w) as the value from entrepreneurship that a high type
agent gets when the interest rate the bank charges him is 1. It is easy to see
that this is independent of his wealth. By definition: w = vH(1, w). Since
vH(1, w) > vL(1, w), w > vL(1, w). This implies that in an economy where the
wage is w there are no low type entrepreneurs.
2. Note that when w > w none of the agents are engaged in the subsistence
sector and hence 1n+1 are entrepreneurs This is true because in this economy
the capacity for entrepreneurship is limited by the size of the population due
to the perfect complements production function. When none of the agents are
engaged in the subsistence sector (w > w), only 1n+1 will be entrepreneurs and
n
n+1 will be workers (the population is normalised to 1).
1 and 2 imply that q ≥ 1n+1 . If high types randomise and become en-
trepreneurs with probability p, since the number of agent in the economy is infi-
nite, by law of large numbers, there will be pq entrepreneurs and (1−p)q+(1−q)
workers in the economy. It is easy to see that this yeilds 1n+1 entrepreneurs and
n
n+1 workers.
5.5 Support for improvement in judicial enforcement
Proposition 4 shows that wage is non decreasing in φ and this implies that a
policy of increasing φ is always supported by the majority. We will now illustrate
that it is not always optimal to ’improve’ contractual institutions (increase φ).
Consider an increase in φ from φ to φ′, changes aˆ to aˆ′, a to a′, a to a′ and w
to w′
Proposition 9. A policy of increasing φ is inefficient if
∆w
∆φ
φ′
w′
> 1−R[q + (1− q)θ]
nw
Proof. Assume that as a result of the policy φ increases to φ′. Since the number
of firms in this model are constant at 1n+1 for w > w the policy is efficient if the
number of high type entrepreneurs increases as a result of the policy. Since all
unconstrained high type agents choose entrepreneurship, if the credit constraint
worsens (a′ > a ) as a result of an increase in φ then the number of high type
entrepreneurs decreases. This is always true when the condition stated in the
proposition holds.
Interestingly in this model the constituencies that arise that are aligned for
and against reforms of contractual institutions are non monotonic in wealth.
We now show this formally.
Lemma 7. There exists a level of wealth a˜ where aˆ > a˜ > a if
∆w
∆φ
φ′
w′
> 1− R[q + (1− q)θ]
nw
(55)
such that agents with wealth aˆ > a > a˜ support the policy and all agents with
wealth a˜ > a > a oppose the policy.
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Proof. All agents with wealth a = aˆ support the policy. Low types with aˆ
support the policy since their payoff rises from w to w′ and w > w′. Similarly
high types with wealth aˆ also support the policy, since the equation establishing
the support of the low types for the policy:
vL(aˆ, r′p(aˆ), w
′) = w′ > w = vL(aˆ, rp(aˆ), w) (56)
Simplifies to
−r′p(aˆ)nw′ > −rp(aˆ)nw (57)
which is also a sufficient condition for high types with wealth aˆ to support
the policy. Note that this condition captures the fact that there are two effects
of φ on an entrepreneurs payoff that work in opposite directions. Increase in φ
increases the wage bill of the entrepreneur but decreases the interest rate. The
effect of the change in interest rate on the payoff of an entrepreneur is increasing
in wealth:
∂vPL
∂rp(a)
∂rp(a)
∂φ
= −a(1− q)(1− θ)θ{q + (1− q)θ} (58)
It can be seen that φ and a are complements in the interest rate; an increase
in φ reduces the interest more for an agent with higher wealth. On the other
hand:
∂vPL
∂w
= − θn
q + (1− q)θ (59)
Hence for a level of wealth However when the level of wealth is low enough,
there exists a level of wealth a˜ such that the two effects exactly cancel each
other out. This happens when condition Equation 56 holds with equality.
Note that this yields an a˜ that is the same regardless of the type of the agent.
Assuming Equation 56 holds ensures that a˜ > a′
Lemma 8. There exists a level of wealth a∗ such that high (low) type agents with
wealth a > a∗ oppose (support) the policy and all agents with wealth a∗ > a > a˜
support the policy where a > a∗ > a′
Proof. Firstly note that all agents with wealth a′ > a > aˆ support the policy.
This is easy to see since all low type agents with wealth in this interval are
indifferent between entrepreneurship and working work a wage, before and after
the implementation of the policy. Hence
vL(a, r′, w′) = w′ > w = vL(a, r, w) (60)
which establishes the support of the low types. Infact for the same reason,
high types in this region support the policy too since this condition simplifies
to:
−r′s(a)nw′ > −rs(a)nw (61)
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which is sufficient to show the support of the high types.
At wealth level a > a′ all low types become workers and prefer the policy
since it increases wage. High types however face a tradeoff between the reduction
in interest rate and increase in wage. At a high types strictly oppose the policy
since the interest rate cannot go lower than 1 so the only effect of the policy
on their payoff is the negative effect through the increase in their wage bill.
Therefore there must exist an a∗ such that a > a∗ > a′ at which wealth level
high types are indifferent to the policy.
We can now analyse how different wealth and ability configurations would
create different constituencies for reform.
Proposition 10. Consider an increase in φ from φ to φ′, the following are the
configurations of support and opposition if
∆w
∆φ
φ′
w′
> 1− R[q + (1− q)θ]
nw
:
• a > a∗: High types opposed, Low types in favour
• a∗ > a > a˜: Both High and Low types in favour
• a˜ > a > a: Both High and Low types opposed
• a > a: Both High and Low types in favour
Proof. The first and second part of the proposition follow directly from Lemma
8. The third part of the proposition follow from Lemma 7. Finally agents with
wealth a < a are credit constrained and hence work for a wage. Hence they
support the policy since it raises their wage. Rich high and low types with
wealth a > a∗ are only affected through the effect on wage change in φ through
the change in wage. Since wage increases and high types are entreprenerus
they oppose the reform whereas low types are workers and hence support the
policy.
The assumption on elasticity:
 =
φ
w
∆w
∆φ
> 1− {q + (1− q)θ}R
nw
(62)
indicates that the elasticity of wage with respect to φ should be high enough for
the feedback effect of φ to be strong enough to worsen the credit constraint.
5.6 Improvement in property rights
We now consider an increase in the probability of expropriation τ
Proposition 11. The effect of an increase in τ on wage is ambiguous.
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Proof.
dLD
dτ
=
−g(a)∂a
∂τ
+ (1− q)d
a∫
aˆ
∂λ(a)
∂τ
g(a)da
 (63)
τ affects the equilibrium wage through labour demand. The sign of this
effect is indeterminate since ∂a∂τ > 0 and
∂λ(a)
∂τ > 0
Proposition 12. It is always inefficient to increase τ
Proof. a is the only threshold that is increasing in τ and hence increasing τ
unambiguously worsens the credit constraint. This is equivalent with inefficiency
as the number of high type entrepreneurs decreases.
These two results show that though it is always efficient to reduce τ , since the
effect of a change in τ on wages is ambiguous, such a policy does not necessarily
have majority support. Examples can be constructed where the distribution of
wealth is such that agents would vote for an increase in τ .
6 Extention: An example where increasing φ re-
duces total surplus
We now construct an example where increasing φ reduces the total surplus. In
our model contractual institution is characterized by the parameter φ, where
1 − φ is the proportion of collateral that is lost during the recovery of pledged
assets by the bank in the event of default. One can think of φ as the degree
of judicial efficiency. There are two ways through which φ affects the total
surplus. There is a direct inefficiency of loss of part of collateral in case of
default when φ is low. There is also an indirect effect through the effect of φ on
the composition of the pool of borrowers. This second effect can potentially go
in the opposite direction and can overwhelm the first. This effect works through
the labour market. It has been shown in proposition (4) that the equilibrium
wage is monotonically increasing in φ. In the following example the quality of
pool effect dominates and hence the surplus maximising φ in the economy is less
than one. Assume that the distribution of wealth is discrete. There are three
classes in the population: the rich, the middle, and the poor of size pr, pm, pp
with wealth ar, am, ap respectively. Assume:
Assumption 1. q(pr + pm) < 1n+1
Where q is the proportion of high type entrepreneurs.
It turns out that if there is a subsistence sector in the economy then it is
always surplus enhancing to locally increase φ. Hence to make the problem
interesting assume that there is no subsistence sector in the economy. The two
feasible values for φ will be {φ, 1}. In this economy, for some parameter values,
the credit constraint will be higher with φ = 1. Assume that this is the case.
The change in total surplus as a result of increasing φ to 1 is:
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∆TS = TS(φ)−TS(1) = qpm(1−θ)R−(1−θ)(1−q)(1−φ)
(
pmamλm(φ)+prarλr(φ)
)
(64)
The first term in the expression represents the increase in the total surplus
due to replacement of some low type entrepreneurs by high types as a result
of access to credit due to reduction in the credit constraint. The second term
represents the reduction in the surplus due to destruction of a proportion of
assets in case of default due to imperfect judiciary. In the second term λ(φ) is the
proportion of low type entrepreneurs with wealth i that choose entrepreneurship
in equilibrium.
Lemma 9. If credit constraint worsens as a result of an increase in φ from φ
to 1, then λm(φ) = 1
Proof. Assume this is not true. Then there are two possibilities: either λm(φ) =
0 or 0 < λm(φ) < 1. Consider λm(φ) = 0. This implies that λr(φ) = 0 since
∂λ
∂a < 0. This implies that all entrepreneurs are high types. This contradicts
Assumption 1. If 0 < λm(φ) < 1 then the interest rate for agents with wealth
am is:
rs(am, (φ) =
θR+M − w(φ)− (1− θ)am
nw(φ)θ
Substituting this into the equation that determines the credit constraint:
R− rs(am, φ)nw(φ) ≥ 0
it is easy to check that the credit constrain is decreasing in equilibrium wage.
Since the equilibrium wage is monotonically increasing in φ and hence the credit
constraint with φ = 1 must be lower than the credit constraint with φ but this
is a contradiction.
Hence the change in total surplus simplifies to:
∆TS = qpm(1− θ)R− (1− θ)(1− q)(1− φ)
(
pmam + prarλr(φ)
)
(65)
Now we can back out λr(φ) since we know that the proportion of en-
trepreneurs in the economy is 1n+1 .
λr(φ) =
(
1
(n+ 1)pr
− pm
pr
− q
)
1
1− q
Substituting this into the expression for the change in total surplus, we find
that ∆TS > 0 if:
R >
1− φ
q
(
(1− q)am +
(
1
(n+ 1)pm
− 1− q pr
pm
)
ar
)
(66)
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This equation ensures that if the credit constraint worsens as a result of an
increase in φ, the loss of efficiency through reduction in the quality of the pool
of entrepreneurs dominates the loss of collateral during recovery with a lower φ.
The credit constraint worsens if:
R− nw(φ)rp(am, φ) > 0 > R− nw(1)rp(am, 1)
Solving the model to derive the equilibrium wage rate, and interest rate at
wealth level am for both values of φ we find:
n
θ(θR+M) + (n+ 1)prq(1− θ)(θR+M − ar)
(n+ 1)(θ + (1− θ)prq) − (1− θ)(1− q)am >
(q + (1− q)θ)R >
n
θ
(
θR+M − (1− φ)ar
)
(1− pm(n+ 1)) + prq(n+ 1)
(
(1− θ)(θR+M)− (1− θ(1− φ))ar
)
(n+ 1)
(
θ(1− pm(n+ 1)) + (1− θ)qpr
)
−(1− θ)(1− q)φam (67)
Proposition 13. For any constellation of parameter values for which (67) and
(66) are satisfied, φ = 1 is suboptimal.
Proof. (67) implies that the credit constraint worsens as a result of an increase
in φ from φ to 1. This implies that there are fewer high type entrepreneurs with
φ = 1. (66) ensures that assuming the credit constraint worsens, the change in
total surplus is negative for an increase in φ from φ to 1. Taken together they
imply that the credit constraint worsens, and enough high type entrepreneurs
are credit constrained such that total surplus is diminished.
In this example increasing φ to 1 has a perverse impact on the quality of
the pool of entrepreneurs since it worsens the credit constraint by making en-
trepreneurship too attractive for low types who were previously choosing en-
trepreneurship.
7 Conclusion
To summarise our result on institutional efficiency and feasibility, in the case
where the distribution of wealth and talent is left unspecified (except for the
assumption of independence), we find that improving contractual institutions is
always feasible but may not always be efficient since contracting is not always
efficient as credit contracts enabling low type entrepreneurs reduce total surplus.
We find that if reforms in property rights institutions are politically feasible then
they reduce the total surplus. Conversely if they are politically infeasible then
they are always surplus maximising.
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In the case with a discrete distribution of talent we find that improving
enforcement of property rights has an unambiguously positive impact on to-
tal whereas the effect of improvement in legal enforcement of contracts is less
clear. This result dovetails with the empirical findings of Acemoglu and Johnson
(2005) who find that property rights institutions have a positive and significant
impact on the level of GDP whereas the effect of contracting institutions seems
ambiguous. Our political economy result indicates that there is always support
for reform of contracting institutions where as this is not the case with regard to
reforming property rights institutions. Our results bring into focus another role
that markets play. In addition to achieving outcomes on the pareto frontiers
there is a political role that markets play, of creating constituencies that have
preferences over policies that affect final allocations. We have shown that given
this is the case, inefficiencies of market failure may be amplified by the policy
choices that constituencies created in a flawed market make. In this sense our
paper provides an additional reason to worry about market failure; market fail-
ure may lead to a political failure, that is a failure of a political system to pick
the surplus maximising policy.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4. For proving political support it is sufficient to show that
wage is non decreasing in φ.
∂Ld
∂φ
: (n+1)
−g(ap)∂ap∂φ (1− F (θp))− f(θs)∂θs∂φ (1−G(aˆp))−
aˆp∫
ap
f(θˆ(a))
∂θˆ(a)
∂φ
g(a)da
 ≥ 0
(68)
This is because:
∂ap
∂φ
= −
 nw−θp(ap)Rφ2(1−θp(ap))
(1− τ) + ∂θp(ap)∂ap
R−nw
φ(1−θp(ap))2
 < 0 (69)
since
∂ap
∂φ
< 0
∂θs
∂φ
< 0
∂θˆ(a)
∂φ
< 0 (70)
∂θp(ap)
∂ap
=
∂θp
∂ap
1
(1− F (θp))2
1∫
θp
(θ − θp)f(θ)dθ (71)
and
∂θp
∂ap
=
M − w
(1− τ)a2p
> 0 (72)
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∂θs
∂φ
= −M − w
R
< 0 (73)
∂θˆ(a)
∂φ
< 0 (74)
by inspection.
This implies that the equilibrium wage is non decreasing in φ. This ensures
that the policy enjoys majority support. The inequalities are strict when w > w.
If there is a subsistence sector, then there is no effect of φ on the labour demand.
The effect of increasing φ on total surplus is ambiguous. This is illustrated
example in the appendix.
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